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In contrast to numerous studies on exogenous mechanisms of human security—
such as the provision of human security by international actors—this study 
examines the role of informal networks in providing ‘freedoms from want’ and 
‘freedoms from fear’ to the population. With the primary focus post-communist 
South Caucasus (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) this article conducts a rigorous 
examination of informal networks’ critical function as sources of human 
(in)security since the break up of the Soviet Union. Based on a combination of 
open-ended elite (expert) interviews, field observation and close-ended survey data, 
this study demonstrates that apart from the informal networks’ crucial role in 
generating social capital and functioning as indispensable social safety nets, they 
also exacerbate human insecurity by cementing the deeply-entrenched in the region 
traditions of clientelism and corruption.  
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Introduction 
 The contemporary South Caucasus—including the republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan and 
Georgia—is rife with challenges to human security. Ever since the break up of the USSR, 
the populations of the region are constantly affected by a plethora of socio-political and 
socio-economic problems. Of these issues, lack of good governance, entrenchment of 
authoritarianism, income disparity, widespread social inequality and systemic corruption 
are the most common challenges to human security. In contrast to many other post-
communist regions, the end of state communism in the South Caucasus coincided with 
the outburst of violent separatist conflicts. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between 
Armenia and Azerbaijan, as well as the Georgian-Ossetian and Georgian-Abkhazian 
conflicts significantly contributed towards other challenges of post-communist transition. 
In addition, the region also had to cope with the side-effects of a decades-long armed 
conflict in the neighbouring Russian North Caucasus. Corrupt governments, inefficient 
economies and the aftershocks of armed conflicts have kept the three South Caucasus’s 
countries at the lower end of most human development, democratic governance and 
market competitiveness indexes and rankings for the last two decades. Today, the 
challenges to human security in the South Caucasus region are not significantly different 
from the immediate post-Soviet period. In Armenia, while the patrimonial ruling elites 
remain adamantly resistant to change, a stalled transition to a market economy has been 
accompanied by a democratic reform process that has moved at a glacial pace. In 
Georgia, political transitions and the modest progress achieved by efforts at 
democratization are still hindered by economic and political challenges. Over the past ten 
years, oil-rich Azerbaijan has become further bogged down in authoritarianism.  
Of course, lack of democratic governance, weak unstable economies and failures of 
post-communist transformation efforts are not unique to the South Caucasus. Rather, the 
majority of non-Baltic former Soviet countries are afflicted by the similar absence of 
human security, which is characterized both by the lack of ‘freedom from fear’ and 
‘freedom from want’. Amongst a diversity of coping mechanisms developed by post-
Soviet societies to deal with a deficit of good governance and significant economic 
hardship, reliance on informality—informal inter-personal networks and the ‘shadow 
economy’—is omnipresent; such reliance has been ingrained into the social culture. The 
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South Caucasus was not an exception. The tradition of relying on informal networking in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia not only dates back to the pre-Soviet period, but is also 
entangled in a web of kinship, clan and ancestry, which distinguishes it from the culture 
of informality in the Eastern European post-communist countries.   
This paper seeks to examine the function of informal networks as sources of human 
(in)security in the post-communist South Caucasus. The key argument is that two 
decades of human insecurity that followed the end of Soviet rule in South Caucasian 
republics encouraged the growth of informal networks, well-rooted in the region and has 
allowed them to perform some of the state’s functions. Of these, the role of informal 
networking is crucial in family support, healthcare, education, employment, community 
welfare and others functions commonly reserved to the state and civil society. However, 
apart from such positive roles, these informal networks have also hindered democratic 
reforms and undermined institution-building by encouraging corruption and clientelism, 
thereby exacerbating long term human insecurity for the population at large. 
Rather than examining the relationship between informal networks and human 
(in)security in each of the South Caucasus’ countries, this article uses the South Caucasus 
region as a single case study, employing a regional approach. Despite their linguistic, 
religious and political differences, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were once part of 
the same political regime (Soviet Union), they shared similar pre-Soviet history, they also 
share similar pathways of post-communist transformation and their societies have similar 
socio-cultural organization. This allows us to study these three countries as a single 
geopolitical region. While a cross-national analysis may illustrate divergences and 
convergences in each country, a regional approach will allow us to bridge these 
differences in order to provide a more generalizable account on how informal institutions 
affect human (in)security in a post-communist region.  
This study relies on qualitative methods of inquiry and is based on empirical 
findings of 37 in-depth semi-structured elite (expert) interviews conducted by the author 
in Azerbaijan, Georgia and several major cities of Eastern and Western Europe. Two key 
categories of informants were interviewed: (1) policy experts and analysts employed at 
major international and local think-tanks and NGOs, and (2) scholars and researchers at 
major universities and research centres. The sample selection technique known as 
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‘snowballing’ sampling was based on identifying the key informants from the literature 
and internet search in accordance with their relevant expertise or work experience. 
Additional participants were selected by employing ‘referral’ methods: asking informants 
to recommend other experts in the field. All interviews were structured as semi-formal 
discussions during which informants were asked to express their views and opinions and 
to share their professional experience on association between human (in)security and 
informal networking in the South Caucasus region.  
In addition to expert interviews, this study has drawn its insights from participant 
ethnographic field observation, which involved observing the function of informal 
networking in Azerbaijan and Georgia over the period of two decades. Being based in the 
South Caucasus since the end of communist period, the author has had numerous 
informal discussions with hundreds of individuals of Azeri, Armenian and Georgian 
origin on the role of informal networks in the South Caucasus’s societies and firsthand 
observed the organization, structure and workings of such networks.    
Analysis of qualitative data is combined here with quantitative survey data 
borrowed from a number of nation-wide representative surveys conducted in all three 
republics of the South Caucasus since the break up of the USSR. The bulk of survey data 
employed throughout this article is taken from a series of surveys conducted by the South 
Caucasus-based research centre Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC) in 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia from 2007 to 2014. Other surveys cited in this study 
include World Values Surveys (WVS), European Values Surveys (EVS) and surveys by 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) conducted over the 
past two decades.  
 
 
Human security and informal networking 
First highlighted by the UNDP’s Human Development Report of 1994,2 the notion of 
‘human security’ has acquired a diversity of definitions over the time. While some 
scholars have applied the concept of human security in the context of peace and conflict 
                                                 
2 UNDP, ‘Human Development Report’ (New York: United Nations Development Programme, 1994); 
Mary Martin and Taylor Owen, ‘The second generation of human security: lessons from the UN and EU 
experience’, International Affairs 86, no. 1 (2010): 211–224. 
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studies,3 anthropology,4 international politics,5 and environmental issues, others have 
struggled to bridge definitional gaps arising from a multiplicity of forms.6 Indeed, both 
broad (maximalist) and narrow (minimalist) definitions of human security are abundant 
in academic literature.7 For example, in their comprehensive volume on human security, 
Alexander and Sabina Lautensach8 presented an all-inclusive definition of human 
security which encompasses political security, economic stability, environmental 
sustainability and human development. A similar approach to conceptualizing human 
security has been taken by Picciotto et al.,9 who suggested combining all definitions of 
human security into a single paradigm that addresses all issues relevant to human security 
and development. On the contrary, King and Murray concisely defined human security as 
‘the number of years of future life spent outside a state of “generalized poverty”.’ 11 
This article understands human security as a balanced combination of two 
underlying principles: ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’. Human security as 
‘freedom from fear’ not only ensures physical safety of individuals, but also ‘meaningful 
participation in the life of the community, control over one’s life and so forth’.12 The 
                                                 
3Earl Conteh-Morgan, ‘Peacebuilding and Human Security: A Constructivist Perspective’, International 
Journal of Peace Studies 10, no. 1 (2005): 69-86; David Chandler, ‘Resilience and human security: The 
post-interventionist paradigm’, Security Dialogue 43, no. 3 (2012): 213-229; Edward Newman, ‘A Human 
Security Peace-Building Agenda’, Third World Quarterly 32, no. 10 (2011): 1737-1756; Mary Kaldor, 
‘Human Security: Reflections on Globalization and Intervention’ (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
4 Thomas Eriksen, Ellen Bal and Oscar Salemink, eds., ‘A World of Insecurity. Anthropological 
Perspectives on Human Security’ (London: Pluto Press, 2010). 
5 Matt McDonald, ‘Human Security and the Construction of Security’, Global Society 16, no. 3 (2002): 
277-295; Joseph S. Nye and David A. Welch, ‘Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An 
Introduction to Theory and History’ (New York: Longman, 2011).  
6 Jennifer Leaning, ‘Psychosocial Well-Being over Time’, Security Dialogue 35, no. 3 (2004): 354-355; 
Robert Picciotto, Michael Clarke and Funmi Olonosakin, ‘Global Development and Human Security’ (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2007); Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh and Anuradha Chenoy, ‘Human 
Security. Concepts and Implications’ (London: Routledge, 2007); Mofida Goucha and John Crowley, 
‘Rethinking Human Security’ (Malden: Blackwell Publishing, 2008); Sakiko Fukuda-Parr, ‘New Threats to 
Human Security in the Era of Globalization’, Journal of Human Development 4, no. 2 (2003): 167-179; 
Caroline Thomas, ‘Globalization and Human Security’, in Globalization, Development and Human 
Security, ed. Anthony McGrew and Nana K. Poku (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), 107-132. 
7 Des Gasper, ‘Securing Humanity: Situating ‘Human Security’ as Concept and Discourse’, Journal of 
Human Development 6, no. 2 (2005): 221-245; Ryerson Christie, ‘Critical Voices and Human Security: To 
Endure, To Engage or To Critique?’ Security Dialogue 41, no. 2 (2010): 169-190. 
8 Alexander Lautensach and Sabina Lautensach, eds., ‘Human Security in World Affairs. Problems and 
Opportunities’ (Vienna: Caesar Press, 2013).  
9 Piciotto et al., ‘Global Development and Human Security’, 34.  
11 Gary King and Christopher Murray, ‘Rethinking Human Security’, Political Science Quarterly 116, no. 4 
(2001): 585-610, 585.  
12 Thomas, ‘Globalization and Human Security’, 109.  
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‘freedom from want’, by contrast, prioritizes socio-economic aspects of individuals’ life 
and the provision of basic human needs—employment, welfare, healthcare, food and 
shelter.13 However, these two fundamental principles of human security are not mutually 
exclusive. In the South Caucasus, and beyond, material insecurity is often intertwined 
with physical threats.  
Having selected informal networks as the unit of analysis, the key priority of this 
study is human security of individuals, or populations, from socio-economic ‘want’ and 
socio-political ‘fear’. Such an approach is best encapsulated in a statement by Picciotto et 
al.14 who argue that ‘[h]uman security has to do with the well being of individuals rather 
than the protection of states’. Yet, human security from ‘want’ and ‘fear’ is irrevocably 
associated with the state and its institutions.15 Hence, in this study a bottom-up approach 
to human security is blended with a focus on institutions, formal and informal alike, as 
causal factors of insecurity. Accordingly, the question of ‘insecurity from whom’ not 
only refers to socio-economic and socio-political hardships emanating from the failures 
of post-communist transition, but also to insecurity as a by-product of such failures.  
In contrast to a voluminous body of academic literature on human security 
emphasizing the role of international actors in empowering local communities and 
individuals through development aid, promotion of good governance and a diversity of 
other exogenous mechanisms,16 this paper’s primary focus is on endogenous or local 
coping mechanisms of human security. The most commonly considered endogenous 
mechanisms of human security are reliance on religion, tradition, culture and identity.17 
This study adds to this list by examining the functioning of informal inter-personal 
networks as mechanisms of endogenous human security.  
                                                 
13 Jorge Nef, ‘Human Security and Mutual Vulnerability: The Global Political Economy of Development 
and Underdevelopment’ (Ottawa: International Development Research Centre, 1999). 
14 Piciotto et al., ‘Global Development and Human Security’, 32. 
15 Tara McCormack, ‘Power and agency in the human security framework’, Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 21, no. 1 (2008): 113-128. 
16 Amitav Acharya, ‘Human Security: East versus West’, International Journal 56, no. 3 (2001): 442-460; 
Newman, ‘A Human Security Peace-Building Agenda’; Kaldor, ‘Human Security’; Piciotto et al., ‘Global 
Development and Human Security’; McGrew and Poku, ‘Globalization, Development and Human 
Security’; Giorgio Shani, Sato Makoto and Mustapha Kamal Pasha, eds., ‘Protecting Human Security in a 
Post 9/11 World Critical and Global Insights’ (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007); Monica den Boer 
and Jaap de Wilde, eds., ‘The Viability of Human Security’ (Amsterdam: University of Amsterdam Press, 
2008). 
17 Eriksen et al., ‘A World of Insecurity’. 
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This leads towards the next concept—‘informal networks’. Informal networks, 
otherwise described as civic, social, private, interpersonal or personal networks,18 are 
broadly defined by Newman19 as ‘a set of people or groups of people with some pattern 
of contacts or interactions between them’. For Rose20 informal networks ‘are face-to-face 
relationships between a limited number of individuals who know each other and are 
bound together by kinship, friendship, or propinquity’. Granovetter,21 in his theory on the 
Strength of Weak Ties, defines all individuals within a society as organized into strong tie 
networks—groups of people linked to each other by family, kinship or friendship 
connections. Yet, there has been surprisingly little consideration of informal networks in 
current human security literature. Far more attention to the role of networks in providing 
human insecurity has been paid in studies on social capital and informality in the post-
communist context. Sik22 insisted that informal networks were widely employed in 
Hungary as coping mechanisms in the face of economic crises in the immediate post-
communist period. Rose23 has also argued that in Russia, as well as in other ‘hour-glass’ 
societies (that is, countries with weak and ineffective governance), informal networks 
perform both economic and political functions. A similar assumption was also introduced 
by Ledeneva,24 Lomnitz25 and Lonkila26 in their studies on informal practices in Russia 
and elsewhere. Informal networks, as coping mechanisms, were also widespread at 
                                                 
18 Gerald M. Easter, ‘Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined’, 
World Politics 48, no. 4 (1996): 551-578. 
19 Mark Newman, ‘The Structure and Function of Complex Networks’, SIAM Review 45, no. 2 (2003): 167-
256, 174. 
20 Richard Rose, ‘Getting Things Done in Anti-modern Society: Social Capital Networks in Russia’, in 
Social Capital. A Multifaceted Perspective, ed., Partha Dasgupta and Ismail Serageldin (Washington, DC: 
IBRD, 2000), 147-172, 149. 
21 Mark Granovetter, ‘The Strength of Weak Ties’, American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 1360-
1380. 
22 Endre Sik and Barry Wellman, ‘Network Capital in Capitalist, Communist, and Post-communist 
Societies’ (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995). 
23 Richard Rose, ‘Russia as an Hour-Glass Society: A Constitution without Citizens’, East European 
Constitutional Review 4: (1995): 34-42. 
24 Alena Ledeneva, ‘Russia’s Economy of Favours: Blat, Networking, and Informal Exchange’ 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
25 Larissa Lomnitz, ‘Informal Exchange Networks in Formal Systems: a Theoretical Model’, American 
Anthropologist 90, no. 1 (1988): 42-55. 
26 Markku Lonkila, ‘Social Networks in Post-Soviet Russia Continuity and Change in the Everyday Life of 
St. Petersburg Teachers’ (Helsinki: University of Helsinki, 1999). 
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different periods of modern history in China,27 Latin America,28 Middle East,29 Africa30 
and other parts of the world.31      
Although informal networks exist in every society, their function as providers of 
human (in)security arises only under certain circumstances. In particular, reliance on 
networks increases when the state fails to fulfil its basic functions and obligations. 
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy32 explain that ‘[a] weak state is defined as one that cannot 
uphold the Hobbesian contract for providing not only security, but also and especially 
developmental goods and human rights imperatives for its own citizens’. They add that 
‘[i]n weak states, the “freedom from want” perspective is perhaps the most lacking: there 
is either no or insufficient social protection, welfare systems comparable to those in 
strong states and health and educational systems are highly incomplete and 
insufficient’.33  
If a state is incapable of providing the population with its basic economic needs, 
this function is usually filled by a networks-operated informal economy.34 The rise of 
informal shadow economies is a particularly well-known phenomenon in centrally 
planned or command economies, such as the economy of the Soviet Union.35 Indeed, the 
Soviet informal or second economy was notorious for its size and spread.36 Throughout 
Soviet history inter-personal underground networks supplied the population with a range 
of difficult-to-find goods and services which the embattled command economy of the 
                                                 
27 Yang Mei-hui Mayfair, ‘Gifts, Favors & Banquets: The Art of Social Relationships in China’ (London: 
Cornell University Press, 1994). 
28 Larissa Lomnitz, ‘Reciprocity of Favors in the Urban Middle Class of Chile’, in Economic Anthropology 
ed., George Dalton (Washington, DC: American Anthropological Association, 1971); Fernanda Duarte, 
‘Exploring the interpersonal transaction of the Brazilian jeitinho in bureaucratic contexts’, Organization 13, 
no. 4 (2006): 509-527. 
29 Aseel Al-Ramahi, ‘Wasta in Jordan: a distinct feature of (and benefit for) Middle Eastern society’, Arab 
Law Quarterly (2008): 35-62. 
30 Christian M. Rogerson, ‘‘Second economy’ versus informal economy: A South African affair’, 
Geoforum 38 (2007): 1053-1057. 
31 Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, eds., ‘Informal institutions and democracy: Lessons from Latin 
America’ (Baltimore: JHU Press, 2006). 
32 Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, ‘Human Security’, 173.  
33 Ibid.  
34 Alejandro Portes and Kelly Hoffman, ‘Latin American Class Structures: Their Composition and Change 
during the Neoliberal Era’, Latin American Research Review 38, no. 1 (2003): 41-82. 
35 Dennis O'Hearn, ‘The Consumer Second Economy: Size and Effects’, Soviet Studies 32, no. 2 (1980): 
218-234. 
36 Steven L. Sampson, ‘The Second Economy of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe’, The ANNALS of the 
American Academy of Political and Social Science 493, no. 1 (1987): 120-136. 
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communist state was unable to provide for its citizens. It has been argued that it is 
because of human insecurity under Soviet rule that informal networks, such as blat 
networks in Russia,37 emerged and became embedded in socio-cultural milieu of socialist 
societies. Even prior to the incorporation of post-Soviet societies into the Soviet Union, 
the reliance on informal structures among these societies was traditionally engraved into 
ethno-cultural traditions and patterns of social organization. However, decades of Soviet 
socio-cultural standardization blended pre-communist traditions with the typical Soviet 
way of life and eradicated pre-communist forms of social organization (such as clans and 
extended patriarchal family in the Caucasus). This massive Soviet socialization has led to 
the creation of informal traditions endemic to the ex-Soviet region.38 For example, as 
Round and Williams39 argued: ‘[o]f course, such [informal] practices occur the world 
over; what is different in the post-Soviet context is their importance to everyday life’. 
This means that the impact of Soviet communism on socio-cultural formation of ex-
Soviet societies, which lasted for almost seven decades, created informal behaviours and 
traditions distinct and more pervasive than informality elsewhere.  
The networks’ relationship with human security is not limited to economics. Rose40 
suggested that ‘[w]hile some capital networks used to produce goods and services in 
every society, their form is distinctive in an ‘anti-modern’ society – that is, a society 
characterized by organizational failure and the corruption of formal organizations’. Weak 
states are also more often than not governed by undemocratic, autocratic or even 
dictatorial political regimes. Over the past twenty years, human rights violations, 
persecution of dissent, political indoctrination and various forms of discrimination 
became inseparable characteristics of many post-Soviet states. Under such circumstances, 
the role of informal networks extends beyond their economic functions; they also serve as 
centres of free expression and as a means of spreading ideas and information beyond the 
reach of state authorities. Networks of dissidents (informaly) of the perestroika-age 
Soviet Union are a typical example of networks’ role in providing the ‘freedom from 
fear’ to the population.  
                                                 
37 Ledeneva, ‘Russia’s Economy of Favours’. 
38 Rose, ‘Getting Things Done in Anti-modern Society’, 164. 
39 John Round and Colin C. Williams, ‘Coping with the social costs of ‘transition’: Everyday life in post-
Soviet Russia and Ukraine’, European urban and regional studies 17, no. 2 (2010): 183-196, 189. 
40 Rose, ‘Getting Things Done in Anti-modern Society’, 147. 
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The growth and proliferation of networks in ‘stressful’ environments is not only the 
result of state’s weakness, but it is also often a side-effect of both political and social 
transition. This is best encapsulated in Eriksen et al.’s formulation that ‘social insecurity 
… arises when societies change quickly. Just as a fish discovers the water only at the 
moment it is being hauled out of it’42 such transition-imposed forms of human insecurity 
are typical to post-Soviet societies. Disappointment with political and economic 
development and the failure of democratization often results in individuals’ higher 
reliance on networks of family members and friends. For example, the rise of networks in 
the post-communist Hungary43 and Romania44 were described as means of coping with 
transitional insecurity. Contrary to expectations of advocates of transition theories,45 both 
democratization and effective transition to market economy did not occur in the former 
Soviet Union. There is no doubt that the implementation of neo-liberal policies and 
generous aid packages provided by Western governments and international organizations 
have aided in liberalization of markets in the former Soviet Union and assisted in 
increasing availability of public goods, encouraging improvements in welfare and human 
security. However, the expectation that post-communist human insecurity would ‘only be 
temporary and that economic growth would bring prosperity to the majority in a short 
space of time’46 appeared to be far too optimistic. The lack of post-socialist transition, 
both in politics and economics, and incomplete institutional reforms have led to the 
continuity of informal behaviours and, as pointed out by Morris and Polese: 
‘[i]nformality is here to stay’.47 
Although informal networks in weak states perform as social safety nets and 
provide the population with human security, they may also have a dark side. In weak 
states, such networks often contribute to, if not overtly create, human insecurity in a 
                                                 
42 Eriksen et al., ‘A World of Insecurity’, 14. 
43 Sik and Wellman, ‘Network Capital’. 
44 Byung-Yeon Kim, ‘Poverty and informal economy participation. Evidence from Romania’, Economics of 
Transition 13, no.1 (2005): 163-185. 
45 Michael McFaul, ‘The Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship: Noncooperative Transitions in the 
Postcommunist World’, World Politics 54, no. 2 (2002): 212–244; Valerie Bunce, ‘Rethinking Recent 
Democratization: Lessons from the Postcommunist Experience’, World Politics 55, no. 2 (2003): 167–192.  
46 Colin C. Williams, John Round and Peter Rodgers, ‘The Role of Informal Economies in the Post-Soviet 
World’ (Hoboken: Taylor and Francis, 2013), 21. 
47 Jeremy Morris and Abel Polese, eds., ‘The Informal Post-Socialist Economy. Embedded Practices and 
Livelihoods’ (Oxon: Routledge, 2014), 1. 
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diversity of ways. Firstly, the existence of a shadow economy is a heavy burden for 
formal economies; they not only divert labour force from formal activities, but also by 
altering incentive structures and economic tradeoffs can disorganize and hamper the 
performance of the formal economy. Informal economic activities also deprive 
governments of tax revenue and reduce state investment capacity. Informal practices, 
such as the notorious Soviet-Russian practice of blat, prioritize reciprocity of favours and 
informal exchanges over formal rules and regulations. Secondly, reliance on networks in 
politics reduces the legitimacy of formal institutions and erodes democratic processes. In 
both economics and politics, informal networks enhance clientelism and corruption, 
destabilizing and crippling state structures. As a consequence the relationship between a 
weak state and informal networking is multifaceted. If human insecurity, increasing as a 
result of state weaknesses, leads to strengthening of networks, the growth of networks 
results in further decomposition of state authority.  
 
 
Dimensions of human insecurity in the South Caucasus  
Along with the devastating effects of separatist conflicts, present-day human insecurity in 
the South Caucasus stems from the weakness of state institutions and the detrimental 
impact such institutions have upon populations they attempt to govern. For over two 
decades after the collapse of the USSR, the pace of political transition in the region has 
been painstakingly slow. Only in Georgia has the pro-Western government of Mikheil 
Saakashvili succeeded in implementing a series of legislative, judicial and administrative 
reforms. As a result, Georgia’s ranking in the Corruption Perception Index reached 51st 
place in 2012, as compared to 133rd place in 2004.48 Democratic reforms in Georgia have 
also resulted in improvements of state institutions. Freedom House, for example, has 
upgraded Georgia to the category of transitional or hybrid regimes with semi-democratic 
institutions and notable institutional improvements over the past ten years.49 Georgia’s 
                                                 
48 Transparency International, ‘Corruption Perceptions Index’, 
 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview (accessed December 20, 2014).  
49 Christopher Walker and Sylvana Habdank-Kołaczkowska, ‘Nations in Transit. Fragile Frontier: 
Democracy's Growing Vulnerability in Central and Southeastern Europe’ (Washington DC: Freedom 
House, 2013). 
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political transformation is still very fragile, however. The failure to consolidate 
democratic reforms and resolve Georgia’s territorial conflicts continues to polarize the 
society and threaten the political stability of the country.  
In Armenia, the process of institution-building remains stalled and as of 2013, 
according to the Nations in Transit project, has been in continuous decline since 2002.50 
Described as a semi-consolidated authoritarian state, Armenia has witnessed a controlled 
succession of leaders from Robert Kocharyan, who held the executive’s office for ten 
years, to his hand-picked successor, Serzh Sarkisyan. During the last decade, no positive 
developments took place in Armenia’s electoral transparency and judicial framework. 
Widespread human rights violations, occasionally eased by government’s attempts to 
create failed dialogues with the political opposition, have continued over the same period. 
Furthermore, rampant corruption in Armenia continuously keeps the country at the 
bottom end of international corruption rankings.  
However, the failure of political transition is far more obvious in Azerbaijan than in 
neighbouring Armenia and Georgia. For the past twenty years, Azerbaijan, which has had 
no transition of ruling elites since the early 1990s, has been steadily descending towards 
consolidated authoritarianism. Declining human rights records, persecution of 
independent press and almost complete failure of democratization has come hand in hand 
with a further entrenchment of ruling elites, limitless presidential terms and flawed 
elections. The Freedom of the World report of 2014 presents the decline of political 
rights and civil liberties in Azerbaijan since 2003 as amongst the worst in the former 
Soviet Union.51  
Throughout the 1990s, all three newly independent states of the South Caucasus 
were equally overwhelmed by economic crises. Their industries, dependent on raw 
materials from other parts of the USSR, were stalled on the verge of collapse. In the 
1990s, the gross domestic products of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia were equally 
low. While in the immediate post-communist period Armenian GDP was the lowest 
amongst its neighbours in the South Caucasus, the gross domestic products of Azerbaijan 
                                                 
50 Ibid.  
51 Freedom House, ‘Freedom in the World 2014’ (Washington DC: Freedom House, 2014).  
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and Georgia were fairly similar.52 Not only was the economic and industrial performance 
of the Caucasus’s republics stagnant but overall living standards—in education, 
healthcare, social and human security—were also in a state of decline. After surviving the 
harsh economic recession of the 1990s, the South Caucasus’s republics have embarked 
on a period of steady economic growth. In the decade from 2001 to 2011, the gross 
domestic products of Armenia and Georgia more than tripled while Azerbaijan’s GDP 
growth placed the country on the list of the world’s fastest growing economies in 2010.  
Nevertheless, such official economic development data fails to capture the actual 
socio-economic situation. Rampant unemployment, low living standards, lack of access 
to healthcare and social welfare, as well as a multitude of other socio-economic problems 
in all three South Caucasus’s countries often remain neglected and ignored by the 
authorities. For instance, according to a Caucasus Barometer survey carried out by the 
Caucasus Research Resource Centres (CRRC) in 2013, over 56% of respondents across 
Armenia were unemployed; these figures stand at 59% in Azerbaijan and 60% in 
Georgia.53 By contrast, the official rate of unemployment in Armenia was registered as 
seven per cent (2012), in Azerbaijan at one per cent (2012) and in Georgia at 15% (2011). 
While poverty is not widespread in the region, low incomes and difficulty of finding 
decent jobs continue to be a challenge for the majority of population. As reported by the 
Caucasus Barometer survey, monthly incomes of the majority of respondents in three 
South Caucasus’s republics were ranging from US$200 to US$300. Only eleven per cent 
of public in Armenia and Azerbaijan, and seven per cent in Georgia described their 
economic condition as good.  
This brief overview of the socio-political and socio-economic environment in the 
South Caucasus suggests that both the ‘freedom from fear’ and ‘freedom from want’ 
remain equally important for the vast majority of population. Political oppression and 
economic instability are long-term phenomena in the South Caucasus. Regardless of 
increases in countries’ gross domestic products, socio-economic hardships remain 
chronically unaddressed. Although the Georgian example presents a deviation from this 
                                                 
52 In 1993 GDP of Armenia (in current US dollars) was USD $356, Azerbaijan’s GDP was USD $530 and 
Georgia’s USD $550.  
53 CRRC, ‘Caucasus Barometer, 2013’ (Tbilisi: Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC), 2013). 
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pattern, South Caucasus governments are usually unwilling to tackle socio-political and 
socio-economic problems in their respective countries.  
The weaknesses of institutions and governments in the South Caucasus have been 
widely investigated in the literature and need not to be discussed in detail for the purpose 
of this study.54 Of particular importance for this paper, however, is that these weaknesses 
generally occur owing to the unwillingness or failure of political actors to facilitate 
transformation, implement reforms and to strengthen institutions. For instance, 
Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy55 distinguish between two types of weak political regimes: 
unwilling and incapable states. Human insecurity in an incapable state is a result of 
structural obstacles, such as natural disasters, geo-political location, and globalization, 
which incapacitates governments. In an unwilling state, human insecurity emanates from 
the lack of will on the part of governments to provide their citizens with physical and 
social security. According to Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, ‘[t]he unwilling state is one where 
people fear official security forces, the state and the police, where corruption is rampant 
and riches are not distributed intentionally, and where dictatorships prefer to strengthen 
their own subsistence.’56 Although neither Armenia nor Georgia can be described as a 
‘dictatorship’, serious institutional flaws, in conjunction with continuous failures of 
policy-makers and their lack of willingness to address human insecurity in a consistent 
manner illustrate the unwillingness, rather than the lack of capacity of these states.  
While international assistance, humanitarian aid and even intervention, are often 
recommended as a remedy for incapable states, apart from policy recommendations, not 
much is suggested in the literature on human security for unwilling states. Yet, solutions 
to alleviate human insecurity in unwilling states often emerge from the bottom-up in form 
of coping mechanisms. These coping strategies are usually created by the affected 
population. The bottom-up mechanisms of dealing with the state weakness range from 
revolutions and uprisings to long-term adaptation strategies. Although the contemporary 
history of the South Caucasus is rife with examples of regime changes and revolts against 
governments, the political transformations more often than not have proven incapable of 
                                                 
54 Armine Ishkanian, ‘Democracy Building and Civil Society in post-Soviet Armenia’ (New York: 
Routledge, 2008).  
55 Tadjbakhsh and Chenoy, ‘Human Security’, 172. 
56 Ibid.  
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significantly transforming the continuity of elites and the engraved into socio-political 
culture traditions. In contrast, reliance on long-term mechanisms of social adaptation 
became a time-tested reliable method of safeguarding human security. Perhaps the most 
widespread, albeit often neglected by the literature, coping mechanism of the affected by 
human insecurity South Caucasus’s societies is the reliance on informal networks.  
 
 
Networks as sources of post-communist security 
A number of socio-political and socio-economic developments of the immediate post-
Soviet period predetermined the survival of widespread informal networking under 
communism and its proliferation. Although the communist state no longer existed, its 
machinery of control and indoctrination were preserved by the political regimes 
succeeding the Soviet Union in the South Caucasus. Short-lived expectations of transition 
to democracy and market economy have turned into disillusionment with failures of 
nationalist dissident-led governments of Levon Ter-Petrosyan in Armenia, Abulfaz 
Elchibey in Azerbaijan and Zviad Gamsakhurdia in Georgia. All three newly independent 
South Caucasus countries were also severely hit by the economic crisis of the 1990s. By 
1995, the gross domestic products of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia dropped by over 
40%. The ‘transition decline’ affected governments’ spending on healthcare, education, 
social welfare and most other public services. Violent separatist conflicts, which started 
ravaging the region even before the end of the USSR, further derailed economic 
transformation, dispatching  waves of internally displaced persons (IDPs) all across the 
region and leaving in ruins the entire territories of Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno-
Karabakh and adjacent to conflict-affected areas regions of Azerbaijan and Georgia.  
As a consequence, reliance on networks throughout the turbulent 1990s became 
even more vital than under the Soviet rule. Kinship-centred informal networks remained 
widespread in the post-Soviet South Caucasus. The World Values Survey (WVS) 
administered in the mid 1990s reported that the majority of the population in Armenia 
(86%), Azerbaijan (85%) and Georgia (94%) believed that family plays a very important 
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part in their lives.57 This data markedly contrasts to responses to the WVS in other post-
Soviet countries: only 68% of public in Lithuania, 70% in Latvia and 79% in Moldova 
said that family ties are very important. The WVS survey also illustrated that over 60% of 
people in the South Caucasus were dissatisfied with their financial situation in the mid 
1990s.58 This shows that as new governments were too weak to provide their citizens 
with basic human needs, informal networks remained in high demand throughout the 
immediate post-communist period.  
While ‘freedom from want’ only increased during the first post-communist decade, 
‘freedom from fear’ also began to acquire a different shape. The relative political liberty 
under the brief and chaotic period of nationalist government in the South Caucasus ended 
with the return of ‘old school’ communist-era elites. Robert Kocharyan in Armenia, 
Heydar Aliev in Azerbaijan and Eduard Shevardnadze in Georgia took over presidential 
offices in their respective republics. All were well-trained, experienced and well-
connected through intricate webs of informal networks developed during their service in 
Soviet administrations. By 1997—with the exception of Azerbaijan where 92% of public 
expressed trust in their government—58% of population in Armenia and close to 50% in 
Georgia mistrusted the leadership of their republics.59 Yet even in Azerbaijan, 94% of 
public believed that having a political system controlled by a strong leader is not good.60 
Entrenchment of authoritarianism and steady, albeit implicit, persecution of regime 
opponents began to increase by the late 1990s.  
 
Structure of post-communist informal networks   
What is the structure and composition of present-day informal networks in the South 
Caucasus? Traditional reliance on family and relatives defines the nature of networks in 
the region; strong ‘bonding’ within a network and weak ‘bridging’ between networks is a 
typical characteristic of the South Caucasus’s informal networks. In the words of an 
expert, ‘strong intra-network bonding of social capital is what Georgians and other ethnic 
                                                 
57 WVS, ‘WVS 1990-1994, WVS 1995-1998’ (Lueneburg: World Values Surveys). 
58 Ibid.  
59 Ibid.  
60 Ibid.  
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groups of the South Caucasus have inherited from the Soviet period’.61 The distribution 
of public goods within such networks is usually based on blood lineage and the proximity 
of kinship ties. Reciprocity of favours amongst family and kin members is often not an 
obligation; instead it is subject to hierarchy and seniority within a network based on age 
and status.  
A typical kinship network in the South Caucasus is staunchly homogenous and 
exclusivist. This means that new members can only enter the ‘circle of trust’ through 
birth or marriage. Each member of a kinship network is also likely to have a circle of 
close trusted friends, which serve as ‘weak ties’ connecting strong tie kinship groups. An 
expert on Georgian society explained ‘that while kinship networks are still prominent in 
rural areas, the most widespread type of networks in urban settlements is friendship 
groups.’62 In Azerbaijan, as mentioned by a local expert, ‘kinship and friendship 
networks are equally important in urban areas. However, kinship groups undoubtedly 
dominate the social landscape of rural settlements.’63 
However, in spite of the importance of friendship ties for the majority of 
population;64 the distribution of public goods in friendship networks is never equal to the 
exchange of goods and services within kinship groups. As Misztal65 wrote about 
communist-era informal networks, ‘[b]eing part of an informal circle was seen as the 
main way of achieving some level of social, financial and psychological security’. Hence, 
outsiders, including not-so-well-known friends, are generally treated with a degree of 
suspicion and will only be allowed into one’s friendship circle after the necessary period 
of ‘bonding’. For instance, an opening for a lucrative job will only be offered to a friend 
if no family or kin members are available to accept it.66 However, favours of lesser 
importance, such as references needed to receive a preferential treatment in different state 
and non-state institutions, are often eagerly distributed to friends and even acquaintances 
with an expectation of reciprocity.  
                                                 
61 Interview at the CRRC, Tbilisi, September 2013.  
62 Interview with Professor, Ilia State University, Tbilisi, September 2013.  
63 Interview with Professor, Baku State University, Baku, August 2013. 
64 Leslie Hough, ‘Social Capital in Georgia’, Caucasus Analytical Digest 31 (2011): 2-5. 
65 Barbara Misztal, ‘Informality: Social Theory and Contemporary Practice’ (New York: Routledge, 2002), 
215.  
66 Interview at FRIDE, Brussels, July 2013. 
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Owing to the limitations of one’s kinship network in providing all necessary public 
goods, the maintenance of weak ties, or friendship and acquaintance networks is essential 
for one’s personal wellbeing. Unlike informal networks in Russia and other Eastern 
European countries,67 where reciprocal favours are distributed equally amongst friends 
and family members, South Caucasus’s informal structures continue prioritizing kinship 
groups over friendship networks.68 Such characteristic is both a legacy of the Soviet 
period, when the survival of traditional families was seen as one of the main goals of 
networking, and is a means of ensuring that the maximum amount of public goods is 
distributed amongst the members of kin groups.  
 
‘Freedom from want’  
On surviving harsh economic recession of the 1990s, the economies of Armenia, Georgia 
and, particularly, Azerbaijan embarked on a process of recovery and growth. By 2006, 
the GDP of all three South Caucasus’ countries more than doubled. The improvement in 
living standards has led to a reduction in reliance on informal networks as sources for 
procuring food items and other day-to-day goods; the networks’ function in providing 
basic material needs of population eventually became obsolete. Notwithstanding the 
availability of consumer goods, however, jobs remain scarce. Healthcare, education, 
welfare, as well as most other public services, were underdeveloped and ignored by post-
Soviet governments. As a consequence, despite the improved living conditions, kinship 
networks have continued to dominate the informal sphere of the South Caucasus during 
the 2000s. According to the European Values Survey,69 over 90% of respondents in 
Armenia and Georgia and over 80% in Azerbaijan believed that family connections play 
a very important role in their daily lives. As explained by several experts, the role of 
informal networking in welfare provision in the second post-communist decade remained 
as essential as during the 1990s.70  
                                                 
67 Ledeneva, ‘Russia’s Economy of Favours’. 
68 Huseyn Aliyev, ‘Post-Communist Informal Networking: Blat in the South Caucasus’, Demokratizatsiya: 
The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 21, no. 1 (2013): 89-112; Huseyn Aliyev, ‘Civil Society in the 
South Caucasus: Kinship Networks as Obstacles to Civil Participation’, Journal of Southeast European and 
Black Sea Studies 14, no. 2 (2014): 263-282. 
69 EVS, ‘EVS 2008 – 4th wave’, (Tilburg: European Values Study, 2008).  
70 Interviews at CIPDD, Tbilisi and APRODEV, Brussels, July- September 2013. 
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No longer used to procure basic consumer goods, informal networks are now 
employed to obtain scarce public goods—such as jobs, financial loans, insurance, as well 
as access to healthcare, education and preferential treatment by state officials. The 
Caucasus Barometer survey,71 administered in all three South Caucasus’s republics 
throughout 2011, revealed that over 30% of the public believed that connections are very 
important in finding a good job. A significant number (over 30%) of respondents also 
mentioned that they did paid or unpaid work for their family members. The role of 
networks in distribution of good jobs is not only determined by the lack of decent 
employment opportunities, but also by the low level of social trust.72 For the majority of 
employers hiring a family member, relative or a close friend offers a better guarantee of 
an employee’s qualities than a good reference letter and is also an opportunity for intra-
network bonding.73 In the words of an expert:  
 
Giving a job to a stranger, even if that person has positive references, is 
both risky and irrational. There is no guarantee that this person won’t steal 
or won’t let you down. It is much safer to hire a relative, or a good friend; 
they will be grateful to you for giving them the job and trust relations 
[built over time] … or family obligations will serve as a guarantee of their 
performance.74  
 
Network connections are also essential in securing such public goods as higher 
quality healthcare, access to services offered by state institutions, admissions to better 
universities and schools, as well as various other public services unavailable or hard-to-
access without proper connections.  
Informal networks are important for the socio-economic human security of the 
South Caucasus’s population also because of relatively low household incomes in the 
                                                 
71 CRRC, ‘An Assessment of Social Capital in Georgia’ (Tbilisi: Caucasus Research Resource Centers, 
2011). 
72 Only 27% of respondents to the Caucasus Barometer 2013 survey in Azerbaijan believed that most 
people can be trusted. In Armenia, the level of social trust was even lower: 15% of survey participants. And 
in Georgia 30% of the public had trust in people.  
73 Interview at CRRC, Tbilisi, September 2013.  
74 Interview at ISET, Tbilisi, September 2013. 
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region. For example, the 2013 Caucasus Barometer survey75 found that the majority of 
respondents in Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia described their monthly income as 
below US$300. At the same time over 80% of survey participants in Armenia and 
Georgia and over 90% in Azerbaijan said that the lowest monthly income should be 
above US$400. Notwithstanding relatively low official poverty data,76 actual poverty 
level is fairly high in all three republics. For instance, contrary to official figures, 50% of 
Caucasus Barometer’s respondents in Georgia, 57% in Azerbaijan and 55% in Armenia 
described their current economic rung as lowest in the country. A study by the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development77 shows that during the global financial crisis 
of 2008-10, the South Caucasus’s households had the highest amongst all other post-
communist regions use of private safety nets and the lowest reliance on public safety 
nets. 
Most households in the South Caucasus also lack financial security. According to 
the Caucasus Barometer survey,78 88% of the public in Armenia, 82% in Azerbaijan and 
89% in Georgia had no personal savings. Similarly, over 60% of respondents in Armenia, 
60% in Azerbaijan and over 40% in Georgia did not have bank accounts. Hence, reliance 
on networks for loans and financial support in moments of need becomes the only 
available source of material assistance for the majority of people. The survey’s results 
also emphasized that almost half of the region’s population have personal debts and 59% 
of people in Georgia, 52% in Armenia and 53% in Azerbaijan mentioned that they 
regularly borrow money for food. Over 60% of the public in Azerbaijan and over 40% in 
Armenia and Georgia also said that their ability to borrow money outside of the 
household is very limited. As echoed by an expert in Georgia:  
 
It is an unwritten rule that to borrow some money you need to approach 
only the well-trusted members of your network—usually close relatives. 
                                                 
75 CRRC, ‘Caucasus Barometer, 2013’. 
76 According to the World Bank, the poverty headcount ratio at national poverty line in Armenia is 35.8% 
(2010), in Azerbaijan is 15.8% (2008) and 24.7% (2009) in Georgia.  
77 EBRD, ‘Life in Transition. After the Crisis’ (London: European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, 2011), 10. 
78 CRRC, ‘Caucasus Barometer, 2013’. 
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They know that you have to return money and they will not ask for the 
interest. Also, unlike banks, they won’t pressure you [to payback].79  
 
Informal networks also serve as social safety nets offering assistance to their 
members in emergencies. For instance, almost 90% of the public in Armenia and 
Azerbaijan and over 80% in Georgia in responding to a question by the Caucasus 
Barometer survey on who provided them assistance in moments of emergency indicated 
their families and relatives. Similar data is presented by the ‘Volunteerism and Civic 
Participation survey, conducted by the CRRC in Georgia;80 the plurality of respondents 
stated that they do not have car insurance and in case of damages in car accidents they 
would borrow money from family or relatives.  
This analysis of recent data highlights how informal networks in present-day 
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia perform essential socio-economic functions. Most 
importantly, the absence or deficiency of basic public services and the lack of public 
safety nets provided by the state to ensure the socio-economic security of its citizens 
enhance the networks’ function as providers of human security in areas and sectors 
traditionally reserved to the state and non-state formal institutions, such as public 
agencies, banks, companies, NGOs and other formal institutions. Although the 
importance of networks in safeguarding socio-economic safety nets stems from the 
weakness of formal institutions, this reliance on informality further weakens formal 
structures and deprives them of credibility.81 In Armenia and Georgia less than half of the 
population trusts banks and in Azerbaijan the level of trust towards formal financial 
institutions is below 50%.82 Respondents expressed similarly low levels of trust towards 
healthcare and educational systems. In Georgia less than 50% of respondents expressed 
their trust in the public healthcare system, in Armenia 42% and in Azerbaijan 50%.83    
 
 
                                                 
79 Interview at ISET, Tbilisi, September 2013.  
80 CRRC, ‘Volunteerism and civic participation 2011 survey in Georgia’ (Tbilisi: Caucasus Research 
Resource Centers (CRRC), 2011). 
81 Interviews at several NGOs in Tbilisi and Baku, August-September 2013.  
82 CRRC, ‘Caucasus Barometer, 2013’. 
83 Ibid.  
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‘Freedom from fear’ 
Unlike economic growth, political developments of the last decade offered little hope for 
the improvement of human security in socio-political areas. Only in Georgia did a range 
of democratic reforms in the aftermath of the 2003 ‘Rose Revolution’ spearhead some 
political change, including the notable transformations of legislative, judicial and even 
the executive branch. A vigorous anti-corruption campaign under Mikheil Saakashvili’s 
administration virtually eliminated small-scale corruption in Georgia. Although the 
achievements of the Georgian ‘Rose Revolution’ were partly marred by Saakashvili’s 
failure to resolve problems with ethnic minorities, in conjunction with the bitter territorial 
conflict with Russia over South Ossetia, decentralization and liberation of the political 
regime resulted in the improvement of political and civil liberties. In contrast, there was 
little positive development in areas of political transformation in Armenia and 
particularly in Azerbaijan. Instead, the entrenchment of authoritarianism in Azerbaijan 
and the lack of political succession in Armenia increased the function of informal 
networking in safeguarding civil and human rights of the people. As lamented by an 
expert, in Azerbaijan ‘because nobody trusts corrupt state authorities, people prefer to 
solve problems through networks.’84  
However, rather than resulting in the rise of dissident politicized ‘underground’ 
networks, similar to the perestroika-age Soviet Caucasus, political oppression in present-
day South Caucasus leads to further distancing of informal networks from politics. In the 
words of a political expert: ‘in Armenia and Azerbaijan lots of people are losing any 
interest of participating in politics, not even discussing politics.’85 For example, the 
Caucasus Barometer surveys of 2011-12 revealed that the majority of its respondents—
70% in Azerbaijan and 67% in Georgia—never discuss politics with their family and kin 
members. Alternatively, 68% of public in Azerbaijan and 69% in Georgia also never 
discuss politics with their friends.86 Although political protests are frequent occurrences 
across the region, rather than challenging regimes, the populations of autocratic 
Azerbaijan and Armenia further retreat into the private sphere. According to the 
                                                 
84 Interview at EPC, Brussels, June 2013.  
85 Interview at APRODEV, Brussels, July 2013. 
86 CRRC, ‘Caucasus Barometer’ (Tbilisi: Caucasus Research Resource Centers (CRRC), 2012). 
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Caucasus Barometer survey of 2011,87 approximately half of respondents in Azerbaijan 
and Armenia thought that bringing a case to the court will make the problem worse. In 
comparison, only 22% of respondents in Georgia believed that applying to a court will 
make things worse. In 2013, over 80% of respondents in Armenia and around half of 
survey participants in Azerbaijan also believed that people are not treated fairly by the 
government. In Georgia, only 41% of the public thought that the government is unfair.88 
The apolitical nature of informal networks in the South Caucasus results not only in the 
separation of politics from socio-economic functions of networks but also in the decline 
of trust towards formal institutions. The levels of trust towards state institutions in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan are dramatically low.89  
Participation in formal civil society organizations is even lower. As reported by the 
EVS of 2008 and the Caucasus Barometer survey of 2011, less than four per cent of 
respondents in all three South Caucasus’s republics were members or participants of civil 
society groups. In the words of a researcher in Georgia, ‘people are reluctant to engage in 
collective action or to join NGOs because informal networks provide all the social capital 
that they may need’.90 Another expert echoes this opinion by adding that: 
 
It is due to this deeply entrenched in the South Caucasus’s distrust to 
institutions and individuals, people prefer to do everything within their 
kinship and friendship circles, rather than dealing with formal 
institutions—be it a state institution or a non-governmental organization—
both are equally mistrusted and perceived as useless by the population.91  
 
As a consequence similarly to the populations’ response to socio-economic 
problems, the lack of efficient and transparent governance is met by higher reliance on 
informality and further erosion of trust towards the institutions.  
 
                                                 
87 Ibid.  
88 CRRC, ‘Caucasus Barometer, 2013’.  
89 According to the Caucasus Barometer’s survey in 2013, less than 30% of public across the region trust 
local governments, less than 20% trust court systems and mass media.   
90 Interview at CRRC, Tbilisi, September 2013. 
91 Interview at APRODEV, Brussels, July 2013.  
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The networks’ contribution to human insecurity  
Previous sections have demonstrated that the post-Soviet informal networks continue 
serving as primary sources of human security in socio-economic and socio-political areas 
across the South Caucasus. However, it is difficult to describe the informal structures as 
efficient bottom-up mechanisms offering human security to populations facing failures of 
governance and/or economic difficulties. As argued by Misztal92 the growth of informal 
networks and popular reliance on them for human security in the communist and post-
communist Eastern Europe reinforced two particularly detrimental factors for institution-
building phenomena: clientelism and corruption. The South Caucasus is not an exception.    
Patron-client relations, employed by the networks as means of preserving hierarchy 
between different networks and amongst members of the same network, penetrate all 
areas of public and private life in the South Caucasus. The principles of patronage and 
clientelism are often intertwined with traditional respect for older, more experienced and 
powerful individuals, who are more likely to occupy leading positions in networks and 
formal institutions. Accordingly, age and experience serve as indicators of each 
individual’s number of inter-personal connections and therefore define the person’s place 
in a network. According to an expert in Azerbaijan:  
 
Elder members of informal structures tend to both patronize and control 
others. As a result, everything [favours] is distributed in a top-down 
manner. This holds true not only for kinship and friendship networks, but 
also for informal networks functioning within institutions. Within such 
structures you can only get promoted to the top if you belong to a 
particular patrilinearly-defined family or clan and you are also an 
‘aksakkal’ [elder]. A similar principle works for distribution of official 
positions in state institutions.93 
 
                                                 
92 Misztal, ‘Informality’, 207, 215. 
93 Interviews with NGOs’ staff in Baku, August-September 2013. 
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Because of the prevalence of patron-client relations and the need to maintain 
hierarchy, informal networks in the South Caucasus remain staunchly homogenous and 
exclusivist. This means that the distribution of public goods is very unequal within and 
between networks. Owing to their closed and segregationist nature, networks only 
succeed in offering human security to members of their own kin groups and, in a lesser 
degree, to close friends. Accordingly, human security—as a public good—provided by 
informal networks in the South Caucasus significantly differs from the protection offered 
to the population by formal institutions in the Western welfare countries. The bulk of 
public goods amassed by a number of powerful networks, rather than being distributed 
amongst the population on an equalitarian basis, remains ‘locked’ within these 
networks.94  
The relationship between informal networks and corruption is twofold. On the one 
hand, bribes, often in a form of material gifts, are usually used as means of reciprocity to 
third-party individuals or non-network members. Since the exchange of goods and 
services through weak ties, connecting members of a particular network to their 
acquaintances and not-so-close friends, cannot often be reciprocated with favours, some 
transactions require a ‘one-time’ sign of gratitude. As explained by an expert:  
 
Offering a gift in exchange for a service to someone who was 
recommended to you by a friend or a relative is not usually seen as 
bribery, but as a sign of gratitude to that individual and as a token of 
respect to a member of your circle who served as an intermediary. It is a 
social obligation.95 
 
On the other hand, corruption is seen as a mechanism of dealing with formal 
institutions. Paying bribes to officials not only ensures faster and more efficient service, 
but also de-formalizes state institutions by incorporating them into networks. For 
instance: 
 
                                                 
94 Interview at Ilia State University, Tbilisi, September 2013.  
95 Interview at Baku State University, August 2013.  
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Across the South Caucasus, similarly to many other post-Soviet countries, 
people prefer to build up a sort of trust-based relations with officials at 
institutions by regularly offering them monetary and other material gifts. 
This allows people to both receive preferential treatment and to expand 
their friendship networks heavily investing into these ‘mutually-
favourable’ relations.96  
 
For the past two decades, the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions 
Index regularly placed Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia into the ranks of the most 
corrupt countries of the world. The post-‘Rose Revolution’ reforms in Georgia reduced 
low-level corruption in the country. However, as pointed out by a local expert in Georgia: 
 
It is true that corruption has been eradicated on the lower levels of 
governmental bureaucracy. For instance, if you want to extend your 
passport or receive a land register you no longer have to pay a bribe. Yet, 
now it [corruption] switched to higher levels and it is more of an issue of 
politics.97   
 
Borzel and Pamuk98 (2011) confirm that Georgia’s fight against corruption has 
done little to eradicate corruption amongst elites. Whereas Georgia’s fight against 
corruption has been effective at tackling the issue of corruption at lower levels of 
administration, the 2011-12 anti-corruption campaigns in Armenia and Azerbaijan are 




                                                 
96 Interview at EPI, Brussels, June 2013.  
97 Interview at CRRC, Tbilisi, September 2013.  
98 Tanja Börzel and Yasemin Pamuk, ‘Pathologies of Europeanization Fighting Corruption in the Southern 
Caucasus’, West European Politics 35, no. 1 (2011): 79-97. 
99 Interviews at European Commission, Brussels, July 2013. 
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For decades economic hardships and deficiencies of political and administrative 
governance compelled the population of the South Caucasus to rely on informal 
structures for basic human security. Despite economic and political transformations of the 
post-communist period, the underlying causes of human insecurity—unequal distribution 
of wealth, lack of social safety nets and a deficit of democratic governance—remain 
unresolved. All of the above is further exacerbated by the inherent weakness of formal 
institutions and their inability to provide the population with such public goods as jobs, 
decent and affordable healthcare, education and social welfare. As a consequence, 
informal coping mechanisms continue serving as well-trusted and reliable sources of 
human security in the South Caucasus. Unlike the informal structures in the Eastern 
European former communist regions, the South Caucasus’s networks are very 
homogenous, exclusionist and kinship-centred. These characteristics allowed these 
networks to preserve traditions and culture and provide their members with material and 
public goods in times of scarcity. However, the lack of inter-network bridging, combined 
with high levels of intra-network bonding, leads to unequal distribution of public goods 
and a proliferation of clientelism and corruption. One of the more significant findings to 
emerge from this study is that the informal networks proliferate when no other effective 
mechanisms of human security are available to the population. When there is no 
sufficient ‘freedom from want’ and ‘freedom from need’, networks assume both positive 
and negative functions. It must then follow that the continuous commitment to 
democratic reforms, institution-building and the creation of social safety nets is needed to 
reduce not the reliance on networks as sources of human security but the networks’ 
reliance on processes which are detrimental to human security principles.  
 
 
 
 
